Decionis

Execution Authority for financial infrastructure

Stop Autonomous Agents From Executing Unapproved Financial Movements.

Decouple your AI reasoning engine from your actual systems of record. Instantly identify where your credit or reporting pipelines leak execution authority, refuse any movement whose inputs changed after approval, and enforce human approval that is cryptographically bound to the exact action.

Decionis runtime diagnostic

Step 1 of 3: Map the agent's data ingest

Which multi-source formats is the agent synthesizing into your tangible net worth reports?

Real-time threat assumption: awaiting the authority boundary

Map the data the agent reads, then set how far it can act.

Exposure not yet quantified

Answer the next question to see what the agent can change without approval.

Target runtime architecture requirement

Deploy a Decionis EffectAdapter to convert this pipeline into immutable Agent-Safe Intents. Each action's parameters are hashed at capture, and a single-use grant bound to that hash is claimed before anything executes: change one input and the grant is refused.

Built from your answers. Nothing here connects to your systems.

See BEAP

Four layers, and only one of them decides authority

Every institution already runs the first three. The gap is not a missing control — it is a question nobody owns.

Identity

Who is acting?

Your IdP authenticates the human, the service account or the agent making the request.

Fraud and AML

Does this look suspicious?

Your scoring models weigh the transaction against patterns and return a probability.

Access

Can it reach the payment rail?

Your gateways and network controls decide what the caller is permitted to connect to.

Decionis

Does this exact transaction have authority to execute?

A deterministic verdict against written policy, bound to the specific action, before commit.

Three patterns to govern first

Specific decisions with specific policy shapes — not a catalogue of everything a bank could theoretically gate.

Treasury payment release

payment.release

A treasury agent or scheduled system moves to release €250,000. The delegated authority attached to that actor stops at €100,000.

Policy: Release above delegated authority requires a named human with treasury authority to approve on their own device.

  1. Treasury agent
  2. payment.release €250,000
  3. Identity ✓ · access ✓ · risk signals ✓
  4. Decionis
  5. ESCALATE
  6. Treasury authority approves
  7. ExecutionBinding to this payment

Credit limit change

credit.limit.raise

An automated decisioning flow raises a customer's credit limit past the threshold where one approver is no longer enough.

Policy: A raise of €50,000 or more requires dual authority before the limit is written.

Walk this pattern end to end

  1. Decisioning flow
  2. credit.limit.raise €50,000+
  3. Decionis
  4. ESCALATE
  5. Two named approvers
  6. Limit written, dossier signed

Change control on payment infrastructure

deploy.production

An engineer — or an agent authoring the pull request — moves to deploy core-banking.payment-service to production.

Policy: A material change to payment infrastructure requires change approval, production authority and the exact artifact digest.

  1. Agent or engineer
  2. deploy core-banking.payment-service
  3. Decionis
  4. ESCALATE
  5. Change approval + production authority
  6. ExecutionBinding to this exact release

What runs today, and what does not

Runs over the API today

Policy evaluation against the signals you supply, a signed Decision Dossier behind every verdict, and shadow mode first — recording what the gate would have done without enforcing anything.

Private beta

Inline authorization on the transaction path. Phase one replays your historical authorization logs offline and returns a prevented-loss report, so nothing sensitive leaves your systems to find out whether the gate is worth having.

Not replaced, not bypassed

Decionis does not stand in for your payment rail, core system, identity provider or fraud stack. It answers the one question none of them is built to answer, and hands the verdict back.

Running a card program? Card-lifecycle gating — create card, raise limit, merchant lock — has its own page: Execution Authority for card programs.

Where this is written down and built in the open: the banking profile of the protocol — How a Finance Control Evaluation finds where your financial operations create control exposure, in your own figures, and how the same rules then govern a payment run, a transfer, a correction, or a limit change before it reaches your core banking, payments, treasury, or lending system — is published as BEAP v1.0, a Published document, at banking.decionis.com; the execution boundary is implemented as the Agent-Safe Pipeline (Apache-2.0 · v0.1.4); and the evidence index says which control belongs to which of them. Bank lending? The profile's underwriting guide says what an underwriting agent may propose on its own, who signs the credit decision, and what is recorded — and nothing about whether the decision was right.

How a bank gets from a test to a gate in front of its core system — try it, run it on a laptop, watch it in shadow beside one workflow it runs today, bind the sign-offs, then enforce — is the profile's get-started path. What it deploys — one process in front of the core system, with a kit for a core banking system and one for a lending rail, shadow first — is on its deploy page. Every host, credential and threshold in those kits is the bank's to supply; nothing there has run against a vendor system.

Put authority between financial intent and execution

The rollout starts offline, on your own historical data, and only reaches the transaction path once the verdicts have earned it.

See the rollout phases