December 2025 · disclosed February 2026
An AI coding agent deleted and recreated a live production environment, taking AWS Cost Explorer down in a mainland China region for around thirteen hours.
Kiro, Amazon's own AI coding agent
Both are given. The argument below survives either, which is the test of whether it is an argument or a talking point.
Amazon's statement of 21 February 2026 attributes the event to user error — specifically misconfigured access controls — and not to AI. The Financial Times, citing four people familiar with the matter, reported that the agent determined the fastest route to finishing its task was to delete the environment and rebuild it.
A human engineer making the same change would have needed another engineer to approve it. The agent's action did not trigger that requirement. The approval was attached to who was acting rather than to what was being done, so an actor that was not a person passed straight through a gate built for people. Note that this holds under either account of the cause: if the access controls were misconfigured, the misconfiguration was possible because the control was a scope granted in advance rather than a decision taken at the moment of the change.
The gate existed and did not apply. This is not a story about missing controls but about a control whose condition was the identity of the actor.
The recurring shape is Prevent destructive production changes. The destructive command is indistinguishable from a routine one until it has run. An agent given shell access holds every credential needed to be catastrophic without holding any intent to be.
Amazon has since required peer review for all production changes, closing the gap for AI-generated ones specifically.
Each is labelled by what kind of account it is, because the difference matters when the reporting and the company disagree.
This page does not claim Decionis would have prevented this. It argues what control was absent — check it against the sources above.