Skip to content
Decionis
Research note··6 min read

The email said the bank details changed. Stop it where the money moves.

Vendor bank-detail change fraud is business email compromise at its most direct. What the 2026 figures from the FBI, AFP and Nacha show, the five controls that stop it at the payment, and what Decionis does about it today, for controllers.

Decionis Research

What happens

A message arrives from a supplier you pay every month: new bank, new account, please use these details from now on. It looks right, sometimes because it comes from the supplier’s own mailbox after an intruder got into it, sometimes from an address one letter away. Someone in accounts payable updates the vendor record, the next invoice is paid on schedule, and the money lands in an account the fraudster controls. Often nothing was hacked at your end. Your organisation authorised a real payment, on false information. Nacha calls this credit-push fraud and gives exactly this example: a fraudster posing as a vendor and asking to change payment instructions (Nacha — Practical steps to reduce credit-push payments fraud, 28 Oct 2026).

What the 2026 numbers say

Business email compromise, the family this fraud belongs to, drew 24,768 complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center in 2025, with $3.05 billion in reported losses: the second-largest loss of any fraud type in the report, after investment fraud (FBI IC3 — 2025 Internet Crime Report, April 2026). They count losses that victims reported, so treat them as a floor.

In the Association for Financial Professionals’ 2026 survey of 465 US treasury practitioners, 74% of organisations were affected by business email compromise in 2025 (AFP — 2026 Payments Fraud and Control Survey, press release, 14 Apr 2026). The survey reports that fraudsters mainly impersonate vendors or executives to change payment instructions. Among organisations hit by this fraud, 49% reported wire transfers used and 31% ACH credits (AFP — 2026 Payments Fraud and Control Survey Report, Key Highlights, April 2026).

The rules have moved too. Nacha’s fraud-monitoring rules now require businesses that originate ACH payments, along with their banks, to have risk-based processes reasonably intended to identify payments authorised under false pretenses. Larger originators came under the rule on 20 March 2026 and every other business originator on 19 June 2026. The rules do not prescribe how (Nacha — Risk Management Topics (Fraud Monitoring Phase 1), retrieved 20 Nov 2026).

The callback is necessary. It is not where the money moves.

The standard defence is the callback: before acting on a change, phone the vendor on a number from your own records. The FBI recommends verifying changes to account information through a second channel (FBI IC3 — Business Email Compromise PSA I-091124-PSA, 11 Sep 2024), and 94% of organisations in the AFP survey say they verify transfer requests this way (AFP — 2026 Payments Fraud and Control Survey Report, Key Highlights, April 2026). Keep doing it.

The weakness is where the control lives. A callback is a step in a procedure. Whether it happened, who made it and what they heard is usually recorded somewhere the payment run never looks. The payment is released by a different person, days later, from a vendor record that simply shows the new account. And as more of accounts payable is run by automation and AI agents, there may be no person in the release at all. The controls that stop this fraud have to sit at the moment the money moves, and they have to leave a record.

Five controls at the payment

  1. Control 1
    Verify every bank change out of band

    Call the vendor on a number you already hold, never one from the email that asked for the change, and record the change as its own event with who verified it.

  2. Control 2
    Separate the change from the payment

    The person, or the automation, that changes a vendor's bank details should not be the one who pays that vendor.

  3. Control 3
    Hold payments to a recently changed account

    For a set number of days after a change, a payment to that vendor waits for a person, whoever releases it. The fraud needs the next payment to reach the new account; a hold gives the real vendor time to notice and you time to check.

  4. Control 4
    Two people approve, and the requester is never one of them

    Above your threshold, or for any payment inside the hold, two different people approve, and the person who asked for the payment cannot approve it.

  5. Control 5
    Keep evidence an auditor can check

    Who changed what, who verified it, who approved the payment and under which version of the policy: recorded in a form that can be checked later without asking the system that produced it.

None of these is new. Nacha’s own suggestions are the same family: validate payment instruction changes, verify account details through trusted channels, and require extra approval for higher-risk payments (Nacha — Practical steps to reduce credit-push payments fraud, 28 Oct 2026). What changes is whether they are enforced at release, for people and automations alike, or written in a procedure and hoped for.

What Decionis does today

Decionis sits in front of the payment release and decides each payment against your approved policy before it goes: allow, escalate to a named approver, or block. For this fraud, that policy can now say three things.

Each approval is bound to the exact payment it was given for and recorded in a signed Decision Dossier, which an auditor can check offline with the open verifier @decionis/verify against Decionis’s published keys, without an account. The verification note shows how.

The limits matter as much as the features. Decionis acts where it is in front of the payment release: a hosted route, an AP automation or agent calling through it, or your own integration. A hold starts when the bank change is recorded with Decionis, so a change made in a system it is not connected to does not start one. It does not make the callback for you; it makes sure the payment waits for a person, and that the record shows who decided.

If a payment has already gone

Speed is what recovers money. Call your bank at once and ask for a recall, then report it to the FBI at ic3.gov whatever the amount. In 2025 the IC3’s Recovery Asset Team froze $679 million, 58% of the funds in the incidents it acted on, across all fraud types (FBI IC3 — 2025 Internet Crime Report, April 2026).

How to try the controls

Start in shadow. Add the cooling-off row to your approval matrix, import it as a draft policy, have it reviewed by someone other than its author, and run it in shadow mode beside your payment runs for a month. Shadow records what the policy would have held and stops nothing. When a month of shadow shows no false holds at month end, enforce it on one payment rail. If you want to see where today’s payments already fall outside your approval matrix, the Controls Gap Report checks a payments export against it, with no account, and stores nothing you upload.

Sources

Each source was fetched on 20 November 2026 and its SHA-256 recorded. Survey figures are percentages of responding organisations; IC3 figures are complaints reported to it.