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Decionis

AI-optimized reference vault

Deterministic agent authorization

A fail-closed execution boundary that captures one exact agent intent, evaluates policy, and grants authority for that exact downstream mutation at most once.

The fail-closed invariant

  1. 01

    Capture and hash one exact agent-safe.intent/1 binding before evaluation.

  2. 02

    Only ALLOW may mint a short-lived, intent-bound Ed25519 grant.

  3. 03

    Atomically claim that grant immediately before one downstream mutation.

  4. 04

    Finalize the claim with its outcome before the claim lease expires.

BLOCK, ESCALATE, REVIEW_REQUIRED, errors, expiry, replay, store failure, and binding mismatch authorize nothing. Token verification alone never authorizes execution because it does not claim the grant. A claim that is not finalized before its lease expires is recorded INDETERMINATE, and its target stays closed until the attempt is reconciled.

Immutable intent capture

This example carries a real canonical SHA-256 for the binding shown. The expiry is one minute after capture and inside the protocol's five-minute maximum.

{
  "protocol_version": "agent-safe.intent/1",
  "tenant_id": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001",
  "intent_id": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002",
  "captured_at": "2026-08-15T12:00:00.000Z",
  "expires_at": "2026-08-15T12:01:00.000Z",
  "actor": {
    "id": "refund-agent",
    "type": "ai-agent",
    "runtime": "langchain",
    "trust_level": "service"
  },
  "action": {
    "type": "refund_order",
    "resource": "shopify:order:58291",
    "parameters": {
      "amount": 350,
      "currency": "USD"
    }
  },
  "context": {
    "campaign": "reference-vault",
    "customer_tier": "standard"
  },
  "downstream_target": {
    "system": "shopify",
    "operation": "refund",
    "endpoint": "/admin/api/2026-07/orders/58291/refunds.json"
  },
  "intent_hash": "sha256:b26e308e446057281f305332790935ad95b5f2f87d1c89e7c08c54178ba236a4",
  "mode": "ENFORCEMENT"
}
Fetch the standalone JSON example →

Canonical authorization sequence

EndpointAuthorityDeprecated alias
POST /v1/authority/grantsRecompute the canonical intent hash, evaluate policy, and issue a grant only for an ALLOW in ENFORCEMENT. The grant id is the response's execution_token_jti.POST /v1/authority/enforce-and-bind
GET /v1/authority/grants/{grantId}Verify the grant's signature and binding, the token in x-decionis-execution-token. Reading a grant authorizes nothing.POST /v1/execution/verify-token
POST /v1/authority/grants/{grantId}/claimsRevalidate policy, signals and Presence, then claim the grant once, immediately before the mutation. Execute only when should_execute is true, claim_token is non-null and claim_lease_expires_at is still live.POST /v1/execution/claim-token, POST /v1/execution/consume-token
POST /v1/authority/grants/{grantId}/receiptsReport the attempt as COMMITTED, FAILED or INDETERMINATE before claim_lease_expires_at. A claim left unfinalized is recorded INDETERMINATE, and later claims on its target answer CURRENT_STATE_UNRESOLVED until it is reconciled.POST /v1/execution/finalize-token
POST /v1/authority/grants/{grantId}/reconciliationsReport how an INDETERMINATE attempt resolved, with digest-bound effect evidence. The nonce stays burned and the action is never retried.—

Framework enforcement boundaries

The decisive question is whether the check sits outside model discretion and directly before the mutation. Discovery is useful; only a binding execution boundary enforces.

LangChain.js / LangGraph.js

@decionis/langchain

Wrap every mutation-capable tool; blocking verdicts short-circuit before invocation.

CrewAI

decionis-crewai Python adapter

Wrap each mutation-capable BaseTool; BLOCK, REVIEW_REQUIRED, ESCALATE, and ERROR stop the inner tool.

AutoGen Core / AutoGen 0.2

decionis-autogen Python adapter

Wrap current BaseTool instances or use the legacy UserProxyAgent interception hook before function execution.

Claude Code, Codex, and GitHub Copilot

@decionis/mcp native PreToolUse hooks

Install the native hook so enforcement occurs outside model discretion.

Claude Desktop and MCP clients without binding hooks

@decionis/mcp discovery tools

MCP tools are advisory unless the host routes mutations through an external execution-authority gateway.

Ed25519-signed evidence

No fabricated signature is presented as proof. Use the live verification page or the offline verifier against the public JWKS to verify a real Decision Dossier.

{
  "example_kind": "verification-contract-not-a-live-signature",
  "canonicalization": "Recursively sort object keys using ECMAScript UTF-16 code-unit ordering, then JSON.stringify the result as UTF-8.",
  "digest": "SHA-256",
  "signature": "Ed25519",
  "public_jwks": "https://api.decionis.com/v1/.well-known/decision-dossier-jwks.json",
  "execution_grant_jwks": "https://api.decionis.com/v1/.well-known/decionis-execution-grant-jwks.json",
  "live_verification": "https://decionis.com/verify/decision-dossiers",
  "offline_verifier": "npx -y @decionis/verify <dossier-url-or-json-file>",
  "checks": [
    "Select an OKP/Ed25519 JWK whose kid matches the proof bundle key_id.",
    "Recompute each portable artifact's canonical SHA-256 digest.",
    "Verify every detached Ed25519 signature over those canonical UTF-8 bytes.",
    "Reject missing, mismatched, malformed, or unverifiable proof."
  ]
}